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THE IMPROBABLE ALLIANCE:
THE CENTRAL POWERS AND COALITION WARFARE, 1914-191 8
by

LIEUTENANT COLONEL JAMES B. AGNEW, USA
Wartime allies, like mistresses, should be
s e l e c t e d with circumspection and
deliberation. To enter into hasty or
emotion-inspired transitory attachments, be
they for private or public reasons, is t o invite
disaster embracing a relationship marked for
persistent turbulence that begins with
misunderstanding regarding intent and ends
with vexatious dissolution. There must be
p r e s e n t sufficient and complementary
characteristics, accord as to goals, and
m u t u a l l y compensating strengths and
weaknesses to reinforce the liaison against
perverse external forces.
While both alliance statecraft and love
affairs may be risky undertakings, the analogy
grows somewhat indistinct: alliances usually
involve more than two "contracting parties";
t h e global scrutiny accorded coalition
partners far transcends the notoriety accruing
to couples in illicit trysts; the demands upon
union are broader and deeper; and the stakes
are inestimably higher, involving populations,
treasuries, boundaries and national destinies.
T h e exigiencies, frustrations, and
complexities of coalition warfare are
exemplified by the evolution and operations
o f t h e Quadruple Alliance (Germany,
Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria) during
the Great War, 1914-1 91 8. There are several
excellent lessons inherent in the functioning
of the "Central Powers," a coalition of states
characterized by extremely divergent war
aims, radically different socio-economic
s t r u c t u r e s , a n d c o n t r a s t i n g strategic
capabilities. The cultural and geographic
differences were enormous. Unless one
reviews the historic setting and events leading
to the cataclysmic days of August 1914, he
would conclude that the alliance was a most
improbable one; that these states had no
business coalescing for the purposes of
hemispheric conquest. Yet, in spite of the

(What can be learned about Coalition
Warfare from the way in which the
Q u a d r u p l e Alliance (Germany,
Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria)
functioned? Where does the blame lie for
its failure? Was the Alliance a nonstarter
from its inception? Did the partners bite
off more than they could chew? Did the
partners expect more from the
partnership than it was capable of
yielding? What are the lessons for today
and for the future?)

' '. . . it was said that we held
Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey by
the throat, so to speak, ready to strangle
them if they did not do exactly as we
wished. Yet there could not be a greater
perversion of the truth than this
assertion. I am convinced that nothing
showed the weakness of Germany, in
comparison with England, more clearly
than the difference between the political
grip each of them had on her allies."

-Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg
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sustenance and financial largesse; therefore,
any evolutionary historical trace should focus
on her manipulations.
By virtue of history and geography,
Germany feared two adversaries-France and
Russia. Bismarck, the Master Pilot of German
affairs, had laid the cornerstone for
German-Austro Hungarian unity in 1879,
w i t h the Dual Alliance, a preventive
arrangement against Russia and some "other
power," presumably France. In 1882, the
alliance was expanded to include Italy and
was redesignated the Triple Alliance. This
time France was specifically named as a
potential aggressor. It was intended by
Bismarck that these treaties should keep
Britain in "friendly isolation." While the Dual
Alliance effectively bound Germany and
Austria-Hungary until 19 18, Italy, arguing
that Austria's action against Serbia in July

disparities, the alliance, as a military
e n d e a v o r , performed remarkedly well
throughout the war, achieving a degree of
harmony and collaboration which eluded its
adversaries until the spring of 1918. While
their practice of statesmanship and the
formulation of strategic guidance were
significant shortcomings, the four powers
were signally successful in the conduct of
combined military operations against the
Allies on several fronts.
THE STRATEGIC SETTING: 1879-1915

While the origins of the war have been
exhaustively treated by scholars, it is
necessary to review the key events leading to
formation of the alliance in 1914 and 1915.
Germany was the linchpin of the coalition
and fountainhead of strategic guidance, moral
37

From Constantinople, in 1914, Germany
looked very much like a winner.
The Germans spared no efforts to impress
the Turks that this was indeed the case. In
June 1913, cables were dispatched to
Constantinople concerning the acceptability
of a German Military Mission to Turkey to
vitalize the primitive but potentially energetic
Turkish army. The Turks consented, and in
November the Kaiser dispatched Major
General Liman von Sanders and a contingent
of 42 advisers to Constantinople. Von
Sanders, like most enterprising professional
career officers, set about finding things to do,
extending his authority over Turks and
Germans alike, with both beneficent and
detrimental effects for coalition harmony. (If
numbers are any criterion of quality of effort,
which they often are not, by mid-191 8, the
advisory strength would reach 800.) Like
Stilwell in China, Von Sanders' counterpart
relations did not always reflect total
harmony; antipathy and hostility often
marked German-Turkish relations. The two
powers concluded a secret alliance against
Russia o n August 1 , 1 9 1 4 , while
Constantinople officially remained "neutral,"
completing war preparations. The entrance of
the German cruisers Goeben and Breslau into
the Dardanelles served notice to the Allies of
Turkey's probable wartime posture; hostile
action in the Black Sea against Russian ports
on 29 October confirmed her stance. Turkey
was in.

19 14 was incompatible with the agreement of
1 8 8 2 , withdrew by a declaration of
neutrality. Interestingly, she became a
belligerent in 19 1 5, but on the opposing side.
In 1890, Kaiser Wilhelm dismissed the
patriarchal chancellor and embarked upon a
series of provocative acts which, over the
years, heightened tensions throughout Europe
and alienated the heads of every major state.
Despite the solidarity of Berlin and
Vienna's "Nibelung Compact" (as it came to
be called after 1879), Germany's military
arrangements with Turkey were not
completed until the eve of war, and with
Bulgaria not until a year later. This reflects
growing German apprehension of being
isolated and overwhelmed by a major
coalition and a frenetic search for partners of
any sort, even those whose strategic
credentials were somewhat questionable.
The foundation for cooperation between
Bulgaria and Turkey was laid in 19 13, by the
Treaty of Constantinople. On June 24th, in
an aide-memoire to Berlin, the Austrians
essentially proposed an expanded alliance
i n c o r p o r a t i n g these powers. German
Chancellor Bethman-Hollweg attempted to
induce Bulgaria into the camp by postwar
territorial offerings (Thrace and Serbian-held
Macedonia). This price was contested by
Allied counterproposals while the Bulgarians
vacillated into mid-1 9 15, but leaning more
toward promises emanating from Berlin and
Vienna. Germany capped her courtship of
Sofia with a loan of 400 million francs, to
close the deal. On September 6 , 1915,
Bulgaria, a veritable "bonus-baby-withdeferred-payment," signed on with the
Central Powers.
Germany's groundwork with Turkey was
less frenetic and more calculated. Here, joint
commercial interests extended back to 1898,
the year in which the Deutsche Bank secured
Turk concessions relative to deployment of
the Baghdad Railway, encroaching into the
strategic backyards of Britain and Russia.
F r i c t i o n w i t h England over t h e
Palestine-Egyptian boundary, the ascendancy
of the revanchist "Young Turks," and Russian
aspirations for Bosporan hegemony resulted
in a burgeoning Turkish affinity for Germany.

STATUS AND RELATIONS
OF THE COALITION, 1914

The alliance was handicapped from the
outset by a plethora of shortcomings which
persisted and were exacerbated not only by
the actions of its enemies but by the nature of
the coalition itself. There were such immense
diversities and conflicts among the partners
that it is remarkable that the entente
functioned as well as it did through four
arduous years of warfare. To her credit,
Germany had tried to improve upon this
dismal power picture by expanding alliance
connections early in the conflict-Sweden,
Holland, Greece, Italy (prior to her entry on
38

the Allied side) and Rumania were all
approached but declined for one reason or
another. Berlin was stuck with what it had
created.
GERMANY

Germany was geared for conflict and
spoiling for war, although not of the
magnitude in which she found herself by
December, 19 14. Her strategic balance was
adequate, her armies were trained and
supported by an excellent logistics system and
backed by mobilizable reserves in depth. Her
navy, though not of parity with Britain's was
impressive. Her population was nearly
homogenous, nationalistic, and seized with
historical Teutonic optimism concerning her
destiny to dominate Europe. Industrialization
had gotten a running start and total national
dedication simplified the transition of her
factories to a wartime footing.
Germany's "Grand Design," although not
articulated outside of chancellory circles, was
t o c r e a t e a n e w state- " Mittel
Europa"—extending from the Baltic to the
Black Sea. According to historian Fritz
Fischer, such German policymakers as
Bethmann-Hollweg, General Falkenhayn, and
Foreign Minister Jagow envisioned, in one
variant or another, a Germany that occupied
or controlled nearly the entire Central
European land mass, including Russian
Poland, most of Belgium, the French collieries
of Longvey-Briey, and the Caucasus.
The future status of Poland became the
central issue of dispute between Berlin and
Vienna. Although there were many variants
on the German theme, Berlin desired to retain
Poland under German domination, displace
some Poles eastward t o allow for the
relocation of Germans, and create an
"independent" Polish state closely linked
politically and militarily with Germany.
Austria-Hungary desired t o see created a truly
independent Poland, tied economically to
A u s t r i a b y m e a n s o f a Polish
Austro-Hungarian customs union.
Throughout 191 5 and 1916 the "Polish
Question" would drive the two principal allies
further apart, and would contribute to the
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Dual Monarchy's fruitless quest for a sep
peace in 1917 and 19 18. On the military s
the Great German General Staff represe
the model of martial efficiency in Europe,
not without shortcomings such
command rigidity and inherent inflexibility.
B.H. Liddel-Hart commented on the flavor of
German Staff procedures in 19 14: "Executive
skill is the fruit of practice; and constant
practice or repetition tends inevitably to
deaden originality and elasticity of mind."
Walter Goerlitz described other deficiencies
of the Staff, remarkably similar to problems
b e s e t t i n g c o n temporary establishments:
separate development of requirements by
military and naval staffs, failure to exchange
intelligence findings, and the reluctance of
military departments to coordinate plans with
concerned civil agencies.
German officialdom's view of its allies
lacked consensus; there were as many
opinions as there were proponents to express
them. The Kaiser, while espousing a royal
affection for Austria-Hungary's venerable
Emperor Franz Joseph, was disdainful of the
Monarchy's strategic capabilities. General von
Hindenburg, latter-day Chief of Staff,
appeared to respect the Austrian Army but in
his memoirs suggests that Austrian statesmen
had dragged a reluctant Germany into a
Viennese-fomented conflict. Ludendorff was
characterized as "tactless in his handling of
the Austrians." General van Hoffman viewed
German support of the Austro-Hungarians as
a critical obligation. In sum, the prevailing
attitude was one of paternal condescension,
tempered by restrained pessimism.
The view toward Turkey was even more
ambivalent, based upon two separate and
usually conflicting sources of
information-that of the German Embassy
and the reports compiled by the resident
Mission Chief, Liman von Sanders. Von
Sanders' organization had been installed over
the objections of German Ambassador von
Wagenheim; therefore, the two agencies were
at odds. According to Von Sanders, the
Attaches, deskbound in Constantinople,
transmitted roseate accounts of Turkish
military capabilities. Von Sanders, with
advisers throughout the structure, submitted

in the West. German dominance of the
alliance thus established the pattern from the
opening days of the war, forcing the
Monarchy to allocate most of its military
resources against the Russian behemoth, with
a t tendant high casualties and financial
expenditures.
Of Austria-Hungary's forces, Liddel-Hart
gives us the best brief appraisal:

c o m p r e h e n s i v e reports of corruption,
leadership shortcomings, abysmal sanitary
conditions and lassitude, characteristic of the
true state of affairs. Alas, the Kaiser, often
bereft of good news from the Eastern or
Western fronts, was more receptive to the
o p t i m i s t i c E m b a s s y dispatches. This
eventually resulted in an unrealistic German
allocation of tasks and resources to the Turks,
with adverse results in the Mediterranean
Theater.
Little is recorded of the attitudes in Berlin
about her primitive ally, Bulgaria. Aside from
the initial war loan, Bulgaria never received
much in the way of material support.
Strategically, Germany saw Bulgaria as an
eventual land link with Turkey (which was
achieved), and as a check upon Romania's
accession to the Allies (which was not).

The Austro-Hungarian Army, if
patterned on the German model, was a
vastly inferior instrument. Not only had
it a tradition of defeat.. .but its racial
mixture prevented the homogeneity that
distinguished its ally. . . . The troops
within the borders of the empire were
often racially akin to those beyond, and
this compelled Austria to a political
instead of a military based distribution of
forces, so that kinsmen would not fight
each other.

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

In 1914, the Dual Monarchy was in serious
trouble, a condition exacerbated through the
next four years by military defeat, economic
d e b i l i t a t i o n a n d i n t e r n a l dissension.
Throughout Europe, monarchy was in a death
struggle with both republicanism and
socialism. The specter of Pan-Slavism,
emerging from St. Petersburg against the
"Rotting West," led the Hapsburg Monarchy
t o p e r p e t r a t e excesses a g a i n s t i t s
heterogeneous population in a feeble effort to
achieve national unity. Nine different major
nationalities and eight smaller ethnic
groupings c o m p r i s e d t h e Monarchy.
German-Austrians were in a minority-12 of
53 million. To many common citizens of the
empire, Belgrade, more than Vienna or
Budapest, represented the political wellspring
of the Balkan peoples.
Austria-Hungary's political bete-noire
remained Serbia, whose destruction was
desired a b o v e a l l o t h e r objectives
( Austro-Serbian relations, Sarajevo and
Austria's mobilization against Serbia during
the frantic summer of 1914 had catalyzed the
conflict); Germany, however, evidenced little
i n t e r e s t i n Vienna's strategic focus,
concentrating instead upon the formidable
tasks against Russia in the East and the Allies

Austria-Hungary also lacked the vast
industrial base, depth of managerial talent,
and transportation infrastructure of the
Germans-weaknesses that would reduce her
effectiveness as a viable ally even before the
end of the first year's conflict.
TURKEY

Enver Pasha and the "Young Turks"
harbored illusions of recreating, in some form,
the Ottoman Empire, ignoring the realities of
twentieth century power politics. The Turkish
Revolution, Balkan Wars, a traditional
economy, and internal disorder and terrorism
until the eve of war did not exactly commend
Turkey as a world power, although her
strategic location resulted in courtship by
most of the major European capitals. Kaiser
Wilhelm's ambitions to extend Berlin's
influence to India led to more German
c o n c e s s i o n s t h a n the alliance would
ultimately prove worth.
The Turkish armed forces were almost as
diverse as those of Austria-Hungary, but in a
far more archaic state. Consequently, senior
German officers assumed numerous command
and staff positions in the Turkish Army,
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upgrading T u r k i s h combat capability
considerably. This relationship continued
through 1918 and makes for an interesting
study in itself. (The experience of the German
Military Mission exhibits some remarkable
parallels to those of American advisers in
South Vietnam from 1962-1965.)
Under German tutelage, Turks were to
eject a British lodgment at Gallipoli, fight a
very successful delaying action in 19 17-1 9 18,
hold Russia in check in the Black Sea and
thwart Allied linkup with its eastern partner.
These were considerable accomplishments for
the semi-feudal, poor and disheartened nation
that was Turkey in 1914. Turkey's waterways
remained objectives of Allied strategy
throughout the war.
BULGARIA

Historians have given only cursory
treatment t o Bulgaria's utility as a Central
Power member in the Great War. Exhausted
by the Balkan War, Bulgaria did not become
an active participant until September of 1916,
and then only after considerable German
financial support and the promise of postwar
territorial enticements. Despite the marginal
nature of her military contribution, her
political stability was noteworthy compared
to that of Austria-Hungary .
Bulgaria's military effort was only
regionally important in operations with her
allies against Serbia (1915) and against
Rumania (1917). While her relations with her
allies were cordial, her marginal power status
precluded her treatment as a full partner.
ORGANIZATION FOR COALITION WARFARE

General authority for the direction of
military operations for each national
component was vested in its national
authority, although operational control of
specific field forces would, in numerous
instances, pass to foreign commanders-an
expedient measure t o permit combined
operations of limited objectives or duration.
Even during those periods, each military
commander retained rights of appeal (though
seldom exercised) to his own superior
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national authority. In an era whe
generals had seized the controls, the Ka
had no illusions about his role as a supre
commander, commenting on one occasion:
". . . The General Staff tells me nothing. If
people in Germany think that I am the
Supreme Commander they are grossly
mistaken."
Strategic objectives and concepts were
agreed upon most informally, usually during
recurring protocol visits between the Chiefs of
State in one another's capitals. For example,
in Vienna in November 191 5, the Kaiser and
the Emperor Franz Joseph agreed that there
would be no peace concluded unless the Allies
sued for it, a compact which both were to
regret with the passage of time.
The Kaiser did not always rest on protocol
when he desired to issue a strategic dictum.
On 23 August 1914, at a luncheon, he
instructed the lowly Austrian Military Liaison
Officer to begin an offensive against Russia.
Fortunately, General Staff representatives
were present to put this rather significant
mandate into proper channels.
From sources available, Figure 1 has been
p r e p a r e d t o r e p r e s e n t t h e likely
politico-military structure for conduct of the
war and the various lines of authority,
c o m m a n d a n d liaison contrived for
prosecution of the war.
The relationships between the national
executives and the military staffs did not
differ greatly on either side. Both sets of
antagonists employed highly structured
formal organizations, delegating authority
essentially by function and relevance to the
war effort. The notable difference between
the two was the relative absence of influence
of the parliamentary branch, in the case of
the Quadruple Alliance. In Germany and
Austria-Hungary, governments did not rise
and fall upon the capricious note of a national
assembly as was the case in France and
Britain. While one cannot argue that
Germany's interests might have been better
served by a less flamboyant figure than the
Kaiser, the German system militated against
changing horses in midstream. Figure 2
i l l u s t r a t e s Germany's centralized but
functional organization for war, a system

42

43

the forces of other allies. Despite the efforts
of Turkish strongman Enver Pasha to achieve
his recall, Von Sanders remained an
authoritarian figure in Turkey until November
1918.

which elevated military influence and
m i n i m i z e d political interference. This
represented an advantage, at least in periods
of stress, that Germany enjoyed over her
opponents.
Below the Supreme Commander level,
authority for direction of the forces was
centered in the respective national military
general staffs. Here the bulk of planning and
coordination was achieved, directives issued,
supervision accomplished, and ad hoc
arrangements concluded among nations.
T h e preponderance of international
military cooperation was effected through the
exchange of military liaison officers among
the Central Powers. While some authors,
including Ludendorff, suggest that detailed
wartime planning between Germany and
Austria-Hungary commenced prior to August
19 14, there is little documented evidence to
affirm that such was the case. Certainly, it did
not transpire between Germany and Bulgaria
or Turkey because of the circumstances that
dictated their late entrance into the coalition.
Overall, the liaison exchange system prevailed,
but was not without problems. Hindenburg
describes the situation in 1916:

SUPREME COMMAND: A VISION UNFULFILLED

A significant failure in the organizational
endeavors of the Central Powers was their
inability to achieve the subordination of the
national prerogatives of the partner-states to
the degree that insured genuine unity of
effort and some centralization of the
allocation of priorities and resources. By
spring, 191 6, the perennial Russian offensives
against Galicia had nearly exhausted the
forces and national will of Austria-Hungary.
Hindenburg recognized that stronger measures
were necessary to assure more judicious use of
coalition forces than four separate general
staffs had been able t o devise. In June, at
Pless, he broached the subject of creation of a
Supreme Command, subordinating all forces
of the Quadruple Alliance t o a single
commander. The Kaiser was noncommittal.
Persistent reverses in Italy and on the Eastern
Front during the summer and the opting of
R u m a n i a f o r t h e Allies reinforced
Hindenburg's belief that only central
direction could salvage Austria-Hungary.
When he succeeded General von Falkenhayn
as Chief of Staff in August, he pressed his
proposal for a higher order of centralized
command authority. This time, alarmed by
defeats, the Kaiser and Franz Joseph
approved the plan, and a multilateral
c o m m a n d was created-in form, but
unhappily, not in substance. (See Figure 3.)
H i n d e n b u r g was designated nominal
Supreme Commander, but he never enjoyed
the same international support as did Marshal
Foch in France.
While Hindenburg presumably
"commanded" Alliance forces on the Eastern
Front, his real function was that of an
"honest broker," reconciling differences
among the respective general staffs and
providing general outlines for forthcoming
engagements. In effect, nothing had changed.
This was as close as the Central Powers came

. . . M y impression i s confirmed
that . . .the most difficult part of our
tasks was not the great operations, but
the attempt to compromise between the
conflicting interests of our various
allies. . . .

Turko-German relations were an aberration
to the general practice of informal strategic
direction and the loose liaison system. The
German General Staff had much greater direct
influence on the conduct of operations in the
Eastern Mediterranean than in any other
t h e a t e r in which Germany attempted
combined operations; this influence is
attributable to the bilateral agreement
whereby the General Staff virtually dictated
tactical maneuvers. While the manifestations
of Turkish sovereignty were observed at the
national level, the energies and initiative of
the Military Mission Chief were such that an
intendant-satellite relationship developed, an
authority the Germans never assumed over
44
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to achieving a genuinely effective combined
command. There was no consuming spirit of
cooperation in 1916 among the Quadruple
Alliance partners as would evolve in France in
1918, when the Allies' backs were to the wall.
While Austria had been whipsawed for three
consecutive years by the Bear, her princes and
generals were not ready to acknowledge, as
h a d t h e T u r k s , German professional
superiority in waging war with large forces. It
is doubtful that even if a bona fide supreme
command had been established, its impact on
the war, in late 19 16, would have been more
than marginal. The Central Powers had waited
too long; even adversity did not prove
cohesive.
COMBINED OPERATIONS, 1914-1918

If harmony and sincere cooperation eluded
the statesmen and general staffs, this was
generally not the case in the field commands.
The local theater and area commanders, not
faced with the enigmas of war aims, finances,
and maintenance of national morale, achieved
a notable degree of professional collaboration,
resulting in a number of tactical successes.
Unfortunately for the Central Powers, their
coalition victories did not usually occur in
strategically vital theaters or at critical times.
Interestingly, while Allied combined
operations ultimately received chief emphasis
and reached maturity on the Western Front,
the Central Powers did not choose t o employ
multilateral forces there, utilizing them
instead in the Balkans, the Mediterranean, and
on the Eastern Front. Research discloses the
presence of only two Austro-Hungarian
divisions in France from 1914-1918. In the
frenetic summer days of 19 18, Hindenburg
contemplated deployment of more alliance
troops there, but apparently the idea was not
pursued.
For purposes of illustration, several of the
more exemplary combined campaigns are
recapitulated here.
1914: THE EASTERN FRONT

While the Germans ware achieving their
classic victory a t Tannenberg, their

Austro-Hungarian allies fell back rapidly
under Russian pressure, abandoning homeland
territory before the war's opening guns had
cooled. Lemberg fell, as did the fortress city
of Przemsyl; it looked as if all of Galicia
would yield to Russia's General Brusilov.
Upon Hindenburg's assumption of command
of the newly created Ninth Army in East
Prussia, he and his Chief of Staff, Von
Ludendorff, endeavored to "coalesce" the
German and Austrian field staffs. At an
e x p l o r a t o r y staffing session, working
agreements for a coordinated
counteroffensive were completed. To offset a
s h o r t a g e o f field transportation, the
Austro-Hungarians loaned a considerable
number of horses for German use; the
German XI Corps was "incorporated in" the
Austrian Army, and the Austrians placed two
cavalry divisions at Hindenburg's disposal.
Unhappily, subsequent disagreements on
force dispositions marred the embryonic
harmony and contributed t o German General
von Mackensen's withdrawal from Warsaw
after initial successes. The Austrians had
failed to inform the Germans of their retreat
on 25-26 October, leaving Mackensen's flank
critically exposed. The Central Powers had
many more lessons t o learn about combined
o p e r a t i o n s . Galicia in 1914 was an
appropriate forum and Mackensen and
Company learned well.
SERBIA

Austria-Hungary would doubtless have
preferred a role in the Great War that limited
her to a punitive expedition against, and
occupation of, Serbia, the Slavic bone in its
throat. Unfortunately, neither Russia nor
Germany allowed the Dual Monarchy t o
maneuver, parade-ground fashion, into its
own backyard. Galicia became, and remained,
a nightmarish meatgrinder that consumed the
young men from the Danube with alarming
regularity. So far as the Germans were
concerned, Serbia was secondary and they
kept the Austrian's noses to the Carpathian
grindstone.
Nevertheless, with the entry of Bulgaria
into the Central Power alliance structure in
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1915, the Germans and Austro-Hungarians
agreed that a propitious moment had arrived
for a sortie against Belgrade. The Germans
foresaw a wartime land-bridge to Turkey, via
Serbia and Bulgaria; the Austrian objectives
were obvious-revenge and eventual territorial
expansion. General von Mackensen, by
mutual agreement of the General Staffs of
Berlin, Vienna and Sofia, was designated
Commander-in-Chief of a combined task
force. Planning started on 18 September,
early enough to effect deployment of the
forces (which were considerable):
- German Eleventh Army: 7 German
divisions.
- Austro-Hungarian Third Army: 4
Austro-Hungarian, 3 G e r m a n divisions.
- Bulgarian First A r m y : 4 Bulgarian
divisions (ultimately 8).
- Austro-Hungarian Danube Flotilla* (To
support initial river crossings).
The operation commenced on 7-8 October
with multiple German and Austrian crossings
of the Danube from the north. Other Austrian
troops entered Serbia from the west, via
Bosnia. The Bulgars moved from the east on
11 O c t o b e r . Serbian fortified
towns
(including the capital) and communications
centers fell in accordance with the coalition's
timetable.
The Serbian Army was pushed steadily
south by a coordinated effort. In response to
a plea from Belgrade for assistance, a
combined British and French force achieved a
lodgment in Salonika in Southern Macedonia.
This contingent crossed briefly into Serbia
but was repulsed at the Vardar River,
withdrew, and did not figure further in the
campaign. Strategically, however, these forces
were effectively "tied down" and could not
be used in more critical allied theaters.
In two battles on 29 November and 8
December, the Bulgarians defeated the
back-pedaling Serbians, capturing 17,000
prisoners and 50 guns. At this point Von
Mackensen considered that his allies were
performing so capably that he began to
remove German troops for employment
elsewhere.
*Note not only the combined, but joint features of
47
this operation.

The campaign opened in October, cl
December. Its brevity, considering the ter
and the tenacity of Serbians fighting on
own soil and its irrefutable tactical succe
the coalition, reflects on the professional
qualities of Von Mackensen, mustering as he
did a tri-national force on short notice, and
upon the spirit of cooperation manifested by
the several alliance field commanders.

In early 191 5, the Russians, hard pressed
by a Turkish offensive in the Caucasus,
appealed to their allies for relief-a diversion
in the Dardanelles. The Allied War Council
agreed and set in motion the ill-fated
amphibious campaign, identified by historians
as "Gallipoli."
In February, British naval probes in the
Straits and the occupation of Lemnos Island
alerted Constantinople concerning Allied
intentions-to effect a lodgment, expand, and
eliminate Turkey from contention.
British vacillation proved fortuitous for
Enver Pasha and his adviser, the prodigious
Von Sanders. Faced with impending disaster,
they moderated differences and proved to the
consternation of the Allies that threat
compels strange bedfellows. Now the Pasha
and the German had to get along.
Enver placed Von Sanders in command of
the defenses, but directed that, with the
exception of one additional German officer,
the coordinating staff be composed of Turks.
Von Sanders, decidedly mission-oriented, did
not quibble. His tactical responsibility was for
a Turkish Army consisting initially of the 5th
and 9th Divisions, commanded by German
officers, and the 3rd Division, under Turkish
command. They prepared defensive positions
on both the European and Asiatic sides of the
Straits, capitalizing on the rugged terrain,
natural fortifications, and time available
before the first British landings on 25 April.
While the British experienced in i t i a l
successes, severe problems of coordination
and a stubborn, vigorous defense denied them
more than a toehold. They continued to pour
additional forces into shrinking beachheads
throughout the summer, as casualties accrued
on both sides. To offset losses, the Turks

received sufficient replacements t o sustain
their defense and defeat a British push at
Anafarta in August.
Throughout the period of the campaign,
German commanders continued to inspire
dogged Turk troops on the heights, directing
also the reinforcing divisions. The force
artillery commander, a Major Lierau, acquired
at least transient fame by his sinking of
English war vessels with field artillery.
While the credit for the pertinacious
defense must go to the Turkish troops, the
token assistance of German and Austrian
combat support units provided the flavor of
combined operations. A German engineer
(pioneer) battalion of 200 men joined the
action in June, as did two Austrian artillery
batteries in November. More German troops
were programmed for a counterattack, but
their arrival was preempted by the withdrawal
of the invading force commencing on 19
December.
Regarding coalition tactics, Gallipoli is
noteworthy in two respects. The First is the
importance that personalities played in
determining events. Had Enver and Von
S a n d e r s b e e n less adroit at mutual
accommodation in the face of serious
personal differences, Gallipoli might have had
a different outcome. The second is that, while
subordination of Turk units to German
commanders was doubtless a bitter pill for the
Turkish High Command, that body was quick
to acknowledge the value of professionalism
and experience in the teeth of an invasion of
the homeland by European troops.
Despite the tactical successes of 1915, all
was not well with the Central Powers. One
burning problem facing Germany and Austria
was what to do about Poland. The divisiveness
of the issue is exemplified by Von Jagow's
acid recommendation:
So long as we have not definitely ceded
Poland to Austria, we have kept in our
hand the trumps to force Austria to give
us the military and economic guarantees
which we need to keep the whole
Monarchy, including Poland, at our
side.. . .

( A n d pundits referred
"Perfidious Albion!")

to

England

as

1916: RUMANIA

Despite prewar professions of neutrality,
postwar territorial blandishments (Macedonia,
Dobrudja, and chunks of Greece, if that state
entered on the Allied side) inspired little
Bulgaria to declare war on Austria-Hungary
on 27 September 1916. Her greed exceeded
her martial capabilities, however, for by 6
December of the same year her ardor had
b e e n s o m e w h a t blunted by invasion,
destruction of her army, loss of her capital
and occupation, in that order.
Again, the ubiquitous Von Mackensen, in a
tactical display uniquely similar to the seizure
of Serbia, achieved a speedy victory.
The Rumanians, despite a paucity of
machine guns, mortars and artillery, had
m o v e d 1 2 divisions i n t o Hungarian
Transylvania in September, after mobilizing a
force of 23 divisions. The Central Powers
undertook initial combined planning at Pless
on 28 July. After force contributions were
determined, the German General Staff
entrained five divisions from the Western
Front, the Austrians sent two southward, and
Enver Pasha despatched two Anatolian
divisions from Turkey. The Bulgars mustered
their forces on the frontier. Again, it was a
three-pronged drive: Falkenhayn, the former
German Chief of Staff, pushed the Rumanians
out of Transylvania through the Carpathians.
Von Mackensen stormed the Turticara River
and moved east into the Dobrudja on the
Black Sea; and the Bulgarians, with attached
German forces, moved northeast, also into the
Dobrudja. Ultimately, all three columns
linked up and Bucharest fell. This campaign
had the earmarks of textbook combined
operations-early, coordinated planning by
four powers; agreed-upon objective; and
formation of combined task forces and rapid,
multilateral execution.
The close of 1916 saw the coalition under
m o r e s t r a i n than a year previously.
Ludendorff, in his memoirs, recalls the
prevailing state of affairs:
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. . . Austria-Hungary

continued to be a
drain on German blood and German war
industries. . . . The same was true of
Bulgaria and Turkey although the
demand for troops was not so great, but
their concern was for money, military
equipment and transport material.
Germans had t o h e l p them
everywhere. . . . The whole gigantic
burden lay on our own shoulders.
The fissure was widening.

Allies' turn. Ironically, in 1918
coordinated efforts of the Allies in Fra
the Balkans and Turkey would bring
Central Powers, themselves the ea
proponents of combined operations, to their
knees.
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

1917:CAPORETTO. THE
LAST BRIGHT FLASH

Russia, defeated in combat and torn
asunder from within, left the war in 191 7.
This strategic turn, freeing German divisions
for use elsewhere, enabled the Central Powers
to undertake one final brilliant combined
operation before 19 18, when exhaustion and
relentless Allied pressure from the south and
west ended the debacle.
Italy, as an allied partner since 19 15, had
engaged in ten battles on the Isonzo River,
trying to claw her way i n t o Austria's
geographic vitals, but in two years had
advanced only ten miles. In defense of
General Cadorna, the Italian Commander, the
stalemate was due as much to denial of
resources by the Allied Supreme Command as
it was to the lack of tactical finesse of the
Italian Army.
I n a n y e v e n t , General Ludendorff
reinforced the Austrians on the Isonzo with
nine German divisions, whose morale was
doubtless favorably influenced by their
redeployment from Russia.
Austrian Field Marshal Archduke Eugene
was designated commander of a combined
force and opened an assault on 24 October.
His objective was to push the Italians behind
the Tagliamento River from the Isonzo. He
experienced remarkable success, for the
Italians passed the Tagliamento and continued
rearward to the Piavo, where they finally
checked the coalition's advance, losing
300,000 men as PW's and 2300 artillery
pieces. The campaign was over by 9
November. Again good planning, aggressive
forces, timing and leadership had scored for
the Central Powers in their last successful
combined operation. Next it would be the
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If coalition warfare failed the Central
Powers, the blame must be laid at other
doorsteps than tactical execution. The field
commanders of all four partner states cannot
be excoriated, as the cases of Serbia, Gallipoli,
Rumania, and Caporetto demonstrate. The
Allies would have done well to emulate these
examples earlier than they did.
The alliance was probably a nonstarter
from its inception. Divergent and even
contradictory war aims, geographic separation
and a tremendous disparity in strategic
capability should have suggested the potential
o b s t a c l e s . T h e r e just wasn't enough
horsepower. Ultimate success was highly
tenuous, dependent upon the occurrence of
too many events which the partners were
unable to effect-the entrance of Italy,
Rumania and Greece on the side of the
Central Powers, or a t least their assured
neutrality; early defeat of either France or
Russia, n e i t h e r o f which happened;
coincidence of national objectives; and an
early, genuine strategic amalgamation of
forces.
The fundamental premise for failure was
that the partners bit off more than they could
chew, separately and collectively. Germany
fought in all theaters; Austria-Hungary
deployed to east and south; and Turkey, at
times, had forces on three fronts. All were
realizing only marginal success against an
ever-increasing array of opponents. America's
e n t r a n c e into the war rendered the
overwhelming preponderance of sheer power
that the coalition could no longer absorb.
In conclusion, the partners probably
expected more from the partnership than it
was capable of yielding in light of the odds. In
1914 and 1915, they were unwilling t o pay
the price of total strategic unanimity when it
could have paid the best dividends. Coalition
warfare did not fail the Central Powers. Their
leaders did.

